“The determinants of students' achievement: a difference between OECD and not OECD countries” by Barra, Cristian & Boccia, Marinella
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
“The determinants of students’
achievement: a difference between OECD
and not OECD countries”
Cristian Barra and Marinella Boccia
University of Salerno, University of Salerno
1 March 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/92561/






“The determinants of Students ‘Achievement: a difference between  
 
OECD and not OECD countries” 
 
March, 2019 
Cristian Barra  
University of Salerno and CELPE- cbarra@unisa.it 
 
Marinella Boccia 
University of Salerno and CELPE-mboccia@unisa.it 
  
Abstract 
This paper investigates on the determinants of school performance measured by the average value of students’ tests 
score (math, reading and science) at school level. PISA data from 2000 to 2012 are used in order to explore this 
relationship. A multivariate regression is assessed considering the different channels (funds, computers connected to 
internet, parental education, student teacher ratio, number of girls and ownership) and controlling for time and country 
fixed effects. The analysis is done both allowing for the total sample and grouping for OECD countries and NO-OECD 
countries. The most important results show that, considering the all sample and the only OECD countries, school 
performances are positively driven by the student fees, presence of girls and computers; also the mother’s education 
plays an important role, while the father’s one is notable only at high level, otherwise is negative. Moreover, differently 
from that the improvement of the student achievement in NO-OECD countries is encouraged from charity funds, the 
presence of girls, and the parent’s education level.  
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For many years researchers have showed interest in understanding the determinants of students’ achievements because 
schooling is recognized as an important channel through which individuals accumulate human capital.  
The main idea of the theory of human capital is that each person’s education is an investment in her human capital 
which allows her to contribute to her society in a productive way. As any investment, the investment in human capital 
requires initial costs, in terms of direct spending and the opportunity costs of students’ time, which are taken on in the 
hope that the investment will create future benefits in terms of higher productivity, higher wages, lower risk of 
unemployment, and so on (Woessmann and Schuetz , 2006). 
Strong evidence indicates that quality of human capital is very important for individual success and for nations as a 
whole. Until recently, however, it has been difficult to look at quality across nations in a consistent manner (Hanushek, 
and Luque 2003).  
Considering policies that might be used to promote higher quality schools within countries Hanushek, and Luque (2003) 
underline the particular emphasis is the power of resource policies such as improving teacher education or reducing 
class sizes. 
Given that identifying the factors behind students’ performances as well as understanding what contributes to the 
divergence in the achievement scores among countries is crucial considering the importance of improving the efficiency 
and equity of the educational systems. 
Education production function studies attempt to determine the relationship of specific measured teacher or school 
characteristics (such as teacher experience, teacher education, class size, per pupil expenditures, etc.) with student 
achievement. However, because parents choose neighborhoods in which to live (and their associated schools) according 
to tastes and resources (Tiebout, 1956), student and family backgrounds are confounded with naturally occurring school 
resource characteristics. 
There is some controversy about the interpretation of the findings of research on education production functions. For 
example Coleman et al. (1966) demonstrated that a large proportion of the variance in student achievement was 
explained by student background factors and that relatively little additional variance was explained by school 
characteristics.  Moreover the schools influence the student academic outcomes also in Goldstein (1997),  
Konstantopoulos and Borman (2011),  Konstantopoulos and Hedges (2008). 
Some other studies recognize that this variation is due to factors as human or financial resources (Card and Krueger 
1996) and that has links to social and economic outcomes (Hanushek 1986).  
Although explanations for differences in school quality vary, implicit in many recent educational reforms is the 
recognition that school context matters (see Carlson and Cowen, 2015). School accountability systems (Booher-
Jennings 2005; Dee and Jacob 2011; Jennings and Sohn 2014) charter schooling (Buddin and Zimmer 2005) and private 
school vouchers (Rouse 1998; Wolf et al. 2013), are intended to improve student outcomes by changing the schooling 
experience. 
Given that and adding evidence to the literature on this point considering both the OECD and NON-OECD countries, 
this paper, using PISA data from 2000 to 2012, which are based on standardized tests taken by a representative sample 
of 15 years of students, aims at identifying the main determinants (students characteristics, family background, school 
funding and resources) playing an important role in explaining students’ performances measured by the average value 
of students’ tests score (math, reading and science).   
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Results show that, especially when OECD countries are taken into account, school performances are positively driven 
by the government resources, student fees, presence of girls and computers; also the mother’s education plays an 
important role, while the father’s one is notable only at high level, otherwise is negative. When non-OECD countries 
are, instead, considered, the improvement of the student achievement is driven by the presence of girls, and by the 
parent’s education level. As to the student teacher ratio it negatively affects the outcomes in the most of the estimations 
performed.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the relevant literature; Section 3 informs about the 
data; Section 4 describes the methodology and the estimation strategy; Section 5 and 6 respectively present the result 
and the robustness check. Finally Section 7 concludes.   
 
2. Students’ achievement determinants: a brief overview of the literature 
The literature based on the analysis of the determinants of Test Score is very rich and explore different channels that 
affect the student achievements.  
Many works are related to the estimation of education production function, and student background, school inputs, and 
institutional structures of the education system affect the achievement in any case.  
For example Fuchs and Woessmann (2007) perform an analysis at level of the individual student. They use the PISA 
student-level achievement database to estimate international education production functions.  The results indicate that 
student characteristics, family backgrounds, home inputs, resources, teachers, and institutions are all significantly 
related to math, science, and reading achievement.  
Considering as determinants of test score the above input (student characteristics, family backgrounds, student’s citizen, 
home inputs, resources, teacher), but in a separate way the following evidence is noted. 
The strong association between students’ socioeconomic background and their educational achievement is confirmed in 
several studies estimated both between than within countries, so both at the country level (Lee and Barro, 2001) and at 
the student level (Woessmann, 2003b). 
As to the analysis between countries in each case, these studies make use of the cross-country structure of the data to 
compare the size of the association of the specific background measure with student achievement across countries. In 
general, the studies find that educational achievement differs substantially by student and family background within the 
separate countries, but also that there is substantial variation in the influence of families across countries.   
Ciccone and García-Fontes (2009) using a counterfactual analysis in order to estimate the effect of educational 
attainment of parents on students’ performance, conclude that in Spain there is a sizable increase in PISA scores relative 
to the rest of Europe when parental schooling is accounted for. But Spain’s performance is rather poor to start out with 
and only rises to somewhat above average when accounting for parental education levels. In Catalonia accounting for 
parental education levels leads to small improvements in the PISA score compared to other Spanish regions and to 
Flanders, Lombardy, and Denmark.  
Later Martins and Veiga (2010), using PISA 2003 data, investigate on the effects of socioeconomic-related inequalities 
in students’ math achievement for 15 EU countries and find that there is socioeconomic-related inequality in 
mathematics achievement, favoring the higher socioeconomic groups in each country and there are important 
differences among countries.  
The socio-economic background plays an important role also for determining learning outcomes and explaining the 
territorial differences in Quintano et al. (2009)  using PISA 2006. 
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As to the analysis within countries, Checchi (2004) use PISA data in order to estimate the effect of family background 
and school level peer effects on students’ performance in Italy. He found that there are significant regional disparities in 
student performance, even after controlling for the type of school attended. Meanwhile, considering both the 
geographical location than the average socio-economic status (SES) of students attending the schools among the main 
determinants of the students’ achievement (as measured by the Invalsi test) in Mathematics in the year 2008/09 in 
Italian schools’. Agasisti and Vittadini in (2012) show that students attending schools in Northern Italy out perform 
their counterparts in the South1.  
In 2015 also Gianbona and Porcu analyze the 2009 OECD-PISA survey to examine individual background 
characteristics influencing the reading achievement of Italian 15 years-old students using the quantile regression (QR) 
approach. Results indicate that some family background predictors (parental education, computer availability at home, 
and availability of a desk for homework at home), the school program attended and, the region of student residence play 
important but differing role for low and high performing readers. For example, parental education shows a positive 
effect on student reading, academic (general) programs perform better than vocational or technical, and Northern 
regions perform better than Center-Southern ones, with differentiated effects along the distribution of students’ reading 
scores.  
When moving from family to school determinants of educational achievement, the topic most intensively researched are 
the inputs available in schools (Hanushek, 2006). Moreover  measures of school inputs include expenditure per student, 
class size, availability of instructional material, and teacher characteristics. The studies reveal that in general, the cross 
country association of student achievement with resources tends to be much weaker than with socio-economic 
backgrounds. 
Taking into account the spending inequality Card and Payne (1998), using a micro sample of Scholastic Aptitude Test 
(SAT) score, measure this  effect on the test score between children with different family backgrounds and find 
evidence that the equalization of spending across districts leads to a narrowing of test score outcomes across family 
background groups.  
The literature also offers evidence about the effects of financial reforms on student outcomes for which there is no 
consensus. The negative conclusions may be depends by the confounding factors, such as family income, that might be 
correlated with both district expenditures and student performance (Hanushek, 1986). Even when student academic 
potential and socioeconomic status are taken into account, certain types of expenditures play an important role in 
explaining differences in student achievement between schools.  
A positive link is also evidenced. Eide and Showalter (1999) use a quantile regression to suggest that some measures of 
school performance may have positive effects at points in the conditional distribution of test score gains other than the 
mean. In essence, these ﬁndings suggest that the marginal dollar allocated towards per pupil district expenditures raises 
test score gains at the bottom of the conditional distribution. The way in which the additional per pupil expenditure is 
spent and how the additional time in school is used will obviously determine how effective these policies are in 
improving test score performance in the relevant points of the conditional distribution. 
                                                          
1 This paper employs the new Italian data concerning the national final examination at the end of the lower secondary education (third year of the 
lower secondary schools, when the regular students are 13 years old) in the year 2008/09 (the first national examination was carried out in 2007/08). 
This final examination has been conducted through a standardized test identical for all the students involved in the exam. About 560,000 students in 




The claim that "throwing more money at public schools will do little or nothing to improve them" was also rejected by 
Mackenzie (2006) who concluded that there is a positive relationship between funding and student performance. 
In 2007, Chaudhary analyzes the effects of Michigan school finance reform on educational inputs and outputs. First he 
wants to explore the impact of Proposal A on education inputs, and second use the foundation allowance as an 
instrument to measure the causal effect of increased spending on 4th and 7th grade math scores. The results indicate that 
following Proposal A Michigan school districts increased operating expenditures by 5.8%. The increase in spending 
was used to increase teacher salaries and reduce class size. The instrumental variable (IV) results focus on Michigan 
school districts and find positive effects of increased spending on 4th grade math scores but no statistically significant 
effects on 7th grade scores.  
As above clarified the literature that examines the determinants of test score is very rich, some papers investigate also 
on the role of class size and of student teacher ratio.  Angrist and Levy (1999) show that reducing class size in Israel 
induces significant and substantial increases in test score for fourth and fifth graders, although not for third graders. 
Similarly, Hoxby (2000) does not find a significant class size effect.    
Fewer studies still have examined the impact of class size on student performance in high education. Bandiera et al. 
(2010) find a significant negative, but highly non-linear effect of class size on student tests results.  They conclude that 
changes in class size have a significant impact on student performance but only at the very top and bottom of the class 
size distribution. Furthermore, they find that students at the top of the grade distribution are most negatively affected by 
class size, particularly in large class sections.  
Many other works attempted to evaluate the relationship between the student teacher ratio, class size and test score 
(Hanushek, 1986, 2002; Brunello and Checchi, 2005).  
Brunello and Checchi (2005) studied as the combined reduction in student teacher ratio and increasing in parental 
education have had a significant impact on educational attainment and on the labor market return. They show that lower 
pupil teacher ratio is positively correlated with higher student attainment but that the overall improvement of parental 
education has had an even stronger impact on attainment; their results suggested also that the positive effects on school 
attainment and on return to education has been particularly significant for the individual born in regions and charts with 
poorer family background.   
As to the teacher quality that is related to teachers’ academic backgrounds, preparation programs, and number of years 
teaching experience this significantly affects their students’ achievement (Akiba et al., 2007).  Moreover the findings of 
both qualitative and quantitative analysis in Darlin-Hammond (2000) indicate that policy investments in the quality of 
teachers may be related to improvements in student performance. A study of mathematics teachers in New York City 
found that students who were taught by fully certified teachers with strong academic backgrounds and two or more 
years of teaching experience benefited the most. Students’ achievement was impaired when taught by teachers with 
little to no experience who held temporary or alternative licensure (Boyd et al., 2009). 
Beese and Liang (2010) use the PISA 2006 data to investigate how school resources indicators (such as teacher 
qualifications, school facilities, and school type) as well as student level variables (such as socioeconomic status and 
family resources) affect the literacy in science in United States, Canada and Finland. Findings indicate school funding 
practices, teacher quality, school type, and family socioeconomic status impact student science achievement and have 








3. Sample Selection  
3.1 Data  
The data were collected from PISA database2 because it has a large time extension and it is rich of information about 
school, student and parent status. In this paper we focus our attention on five waves come from 2000 to 2012 period, 
produced every 3 years, i.e. 2000-2003-2006-2009-2012. Given that our analysis is basically focused on the school 
level, we add other information about student and parent status taking into account the relative questionnaire3.   
The sample of school is based on the European context, in particular OECD and no OECD countries. Basically, the 
number of OECD countries is 34, while the number of no OECD countries is 46. Tables 1 and 2 describe the sample 
used in the analysis by geographical location, emphasizing the importance on countries based on different school 
regime and the variables used, respectively. 
 





4. Empirical Design and variables 
 
In order to analyse how different channels or determinants influence school performance making attention to the 
European context, we specify the following simultaneously equation model or multivariate regression: 
 
            , , 
=         , ,  +            , ,  +             , ,  +        , , 
+          , ,  +             , ,  +             , ,  +         
+       +   , ,     
(1) 
 
where PERFORMANCE is the school performance, i.e. test score of student averaged by school (i=[math, science and 
reading]); this variable is used as proxy in order to measure the school achievement; in other words, this variable serves 
to know if the manager has been able to allocate resources in order to achieve the optimal final output; FUNDS is the 
financial funding obtained by each school taken in percentage (i=[government, student fees, charitable, other]) (other is 
used as benchmark); this variable is an important driver allowing to know which type of funds influences more on the 
                                                          
2 The Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) is a triennial international survey which aims to evaluate education systems worldwide by 
testing the skills and knowledge of 15-year-old students. Since the year 2000, the OECD carried out the Program for International Student Assessment 
(PISA). It is administered every three years to provide comparisons of students’ achievement among the participating countries. PISA collects 
information on all three areas of competencies (mathematics, reading and science) in terms of test scores, with a focus on one of the three 
competencies every three years. In particular this dataset allows the researcher to investigate both on the relationships which above both on role 
played by the geographic differences and the social background.  
3 The dataset consists in a repeated cross section. We do not follow the same students over the years; on the contrary, every year a new cohort of first-
year students enters our data-set. But, on the other hand, we can talk of panel if our unit of analysis is the school, since we follow their every years. 
More precisely, we have data over the academic years 1997/2000 (year 2000), 2001/2003 (year 2003), 2004/2006 (year 2006), 2007/2009 (year 2009) 
and 2009/2012 (year 2012). The dataset gathers information about the students’ basic demographics (gender, age), educational background and pre-
enrolment characteristics (type of high school attended, score gained on the high school final exams), households’ financial conditions (family’s self-
declared income), and general information about the university careers and performances (exams passed and credits acquired). 
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school performance. It is linked to the ability of manager to allocate in the optimal way the resources in order to 
contribute to the success of the school in term of performance; we expect to find a positive relationship between funds 
and school performance; in other words, more funds allow school to sustain more costs and then to have more resources 
making available to students (in terms of tools) to increase the probability to overcome the test;          is the 
number of computers connected to the internet; this variable control for the technology arises in the school; we expect 
to find this variable can have a positive influences on school performance; a high level of technology allows students to 
have more information in order to practice and then overcome the test;           is the set of dummies describing 
the parents (both father and mother) qualification taken in percentage for school (1=ISCED level 1 only or not go to 
school;  2=ISCED level 2 only; 3=ISCED level 3B or 3C; 4=ISCED level 3A; 5=ISCED level 5B; 6=ISCED 5A, 6) 
(group 1 is used as benchmark); we expect to find a positive relationship between education and school performance 
because more educated parents, in most cases, helps student to give their best and therefore most likely to achieve best 
results aimed at passing the test with the probability to reach a high score;      is the school dimension proxied by 
student to teacher ratio; we expect to find a negative relationship between school size and achievements; as suggested in 
literature, the higher is the class size, the lower is the concentration of the students, having an adverse effect on their 
performance (Hanushek, 1986, 2002, Brunello and Checchi, 2005);        is the number of girls enrolled in the 
school; as suggested in literature, the girls have more probability to overcome the test score than man; for these reason 
we expect to find a positive association between the number of girls and school performance;           is the set 
of dummies describing the community in which school is located [1=village (> 3.000 people); 2=small town (3.000 < 
people < 15.000); 3=town (15.000 < people < 100.000); 4=city (100.000 < people < 1.000.000); 5=large city (< 
1.000.000 people)] (group 1 is used as benchmark);           is the set of dummies denoting the typology of 
school (private is used as benchmark group); we expect to find that small community can have a positive impact on 
school performance because manager can better manage resources in order to reach high school performance. 
We also control for two dimensions: the country in which school operates and timing of our sample. In particular, 
COUNTRY is the set of country dummies in which school operate in order to control for different policy implication 
and regime application and TIME is the set of time dummies included in the model in order to capture any possible 
unobservable shocks. Finally   are the disturbance terms. Subscripts i, j and t refer to the unit of analysis (school), area 
where the school is located and time periods (years), respectively. As benchmark, we use the multivariate regression in 
order to estimate the equation (1). Unlike to other techniques, multivariate regression allows to take into account 
simultaneously a high number of dependent variables (in our case math, science and reading test score of student 
averaged by school) with respect to other estimators. In fact, the aim of multivariate o multiple regression, where the 
term was first used by Pearson (1908), is to learn more about the relationship between several independent or predictor 
variables and a dependent or criterion variable. For this reason, we think this estimator is appropriate for our analysis. 
For robustness checks, we also use quantile and multilevel regression in order to estimate the relationship between 
school performance and its determinants (for more information on these two procedures see Appendix). We run the 
regression separating the channels described in equation (1) on the entire sample (ALL SAMPLE), grouping only for 
OECD countries (ONLY OECD) and grouping only for NO-OECD countries (ONLY NO-OECD). This exercise helps 
to understand how the different channels affect school performance in different context. Table 3 describes the statistics 
for all variables used in the analysis. 
 






5. Empirical Evidence 
This section is devoted to the result’s presentation of the multivariate regression model. The most important conclusions 
show that considering both the all sample that the only OECD countries the good school performances are positively 
driven by the student fees, the presence of girls and the number of computers connected to internet; also the mother’s 
education plays an important role, while the father’s one is notable only at high level, otherwise is negative. The student 
teacher ratio negatively affects the outcomes but these results are not robust to the inclusions of all the variables. 
Moreover, differently from that, the improvement of the student achievement in NO-OECD countries is encouraged 
from benefaction, the presence of girls, and the parent’s education level. The student teacher ratio and the public school 
affect the test’s performance negatively and significantly.  
 
5.1 Multivariate Regression. The Results 
Table 4 shows the results on the effect of determinants on math scores at school level for the ALL SAMPLE (columns 
1,4,7,10,13), for only OECD (columns 2,5,8,11,14) and for only NO-OECD (columns 3,6,9,12,15) countries. According 
to the results related to ALL SAMPLE, i.e. when all countries of our sample are considered all together, we find that the 
government expenditure, the student fees, the presence of girls and the number of computers connected to internet 
significantly and positively affect the math test score, while the impact of public schools is negative (column 1); these 
findings are robust to the inclusion of father’s and mother’s education level (column 4), in particular, the mother’s 
education significantly and positively affects the math test score; the father education is important only at high 
education level; no effects of government expenditure is evidenced. 
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
Adding the student teacher ratio to the benchmark model (column 10), a negatively relationship is noted. Finally, 
considering the last model that includes all the variables together (column 13), the results are consistent with the 
previously estimation, except for student teacher ratio and the public school for which the signs are not statistically 
significant. 
As to the science test score (Table 5-column 1), the student’s fees, the number of computers connected to internet and 
the number of girls, positively affect the test score, differently by the public schools that negatively impacts. This 
negative evidence, such as the significantly and positive value of students fees and number of girls, is robust to the 
inclusion of father’s and mother’s educations (column 4) that present the same characteristics of before. Adding the 
student teacher ratio (column 10), that is negative correlated, to the benchmark model, there are not challenges in the 
results. Finally, including the all variables together (column 13), all funds considered seem to be important driven of 
school performance; the other independent variables show the results which before, differently by student teacher ratio 
for which there is no significance. 
 




As to the effects on reading test score (Table 6-column 1), the student fees, the number of computer connected to 
internet and girl’s presence, are important determinants, differently from the public school; these signs are consistent to 
the inclusion of parents’ education level (column 4), with the father’s education level that as before is relevant only at 
high level, otherwise is negative. 
 
[Table 6 around here] 
 
The empirical findings do not change when we add to the benchmark model the student teacher ratio (column 10) that is 
negatively related to the outcomes. The overall results are robust to the inclusion of all the variables (column 13), 
except for computer connected to Internet and the student teacher ratio which coefficients are not statistical significant. 
Now, in order to capture how different context in which school operates affects the estimation, we separate the sample, 
considering only OECD countries and only NO-OECD countries, alternatively (for more details on the composition of 
the sample see Table 1 and 2). This exercise might be useful to the policy makers and regulators in order to understand 
how the different channels affect school performance in different environment. In particular, they could decide to give 
more resources in order to improve the educational levels in NO-OECD countries. This should help to increase the 
teacher’s number, reducing the class size and improving the school performance.  
Considering the same test scores in only OECD countries as to the math score (Table 4-column 2), the positive results 
are subject to the student’s fees, the number of computer connected to internet and the girls’ presence, the negative are 
driven by the public school. When we include the mother’s and father’s education (column 5), the test score appears to 
be positive for the presence of girls and negative for public school. The impact of parents’ education has the same 
significance of before. Considering the student teacher ratio (column 11) for which the impact is negative and 
significant, a similarity with previous estimations is evidenced. 
Finally, when we take into account the all variables (column 14), student’s fees, girls, mother’s education and father’s 
high level of education positively and significant impact upon school performance, while the effect of student teacher 
ratio disappears. As to the science and reading test scores (columns 2, 5, 11 and 14 of Tables 5 and 6), the student’s fees 
and the number of girls are positive determinants of test scores, while the sign of public school is negative. The parents’ 
education offerings the evidence presented before. Differently, no evidence is evidenced for the student teacher ratio.  
Moreover, considering only NO-OECD countries, as to the math score (Table 4-column 3), only the number of girls is 
an important factor, while the public school shows negative and significant evidence. Adding the parents’ education 
(columns 6) that, differently from the previously findings, is a notable factor in improving the test score in all the cases, 
also the value of charity (funds) appears to positively drive the outcomes.  
Adding the student teacher ratio (column 12), that is negative correlated, the sign related to the charity funds appears to 
be positive. Finally considering the last model (column 15), the percentage of funding does not affect the outcome in 
neither of cases and the other variables present the characteristics which before.  
As to the science test score (Table 5-column 3), the charity funds and the number of girls are important factors. Adding 
separately the parental education (column 6), positively related, and student teacher ratio (column 12), negatively 
related, the results present the same signs as before, moreover nothing changes considering all the variables (column 
15). It is important to note that in all the cases considering the NO-OECD countries the number of computers connected 
to internet does not significantly improve the test score.  
Concerning the reading tests score (Table 6-column 3), the charity funds are not a significant determinants; the others 
variables have the above characteristics and only in the model in which we adding the student teacher ratio to the 
10 
 
benchmark (column 12), the students fees significantly improve the reading test score. Finally all the outcomes decrease 
in presence of public schools and increase with the number of girls. 
In order to provide a clear perspective, we sum up our findings. First, we focus considering the ALL SAMPLE and 
isolating the channels as follow: 
 
 Fees for student is the main fund component that most impact on the school performance; therefore, the school 
redistributes this resources providing more services in order to improve its performance (e.g. provides more 
tools that allow the student to pass the tests and to ensure greater school performance); 
 The presence of computer connected to the internet improves school performance. In this way, students can 
practice to pass the tests; 
 The presence of women contributes more to raise school performance; perhaps because they commit more and 
get higher scores which enables the school to increase its performance with respect to man;  
 Public schools get lower performance compared to private ones; 
 There is an exponential relationship (monotonic) between urbanization and performance; In other words, it 
seems that the fact of being in highly populated areas contributes more to the school performance; perhaps 
because they may have more money (eg. student fees) that you can use to increase performance (more 
exercises used to pass the tests); 
 There is an exponential relationship (monotonic) between the mother's education and school performance. This 
means that the higher the level of mother’s education, the more likely the student to pass the test and therefore 
the greater the performance of the school. 
 There is a U-shaped relationship between a father’s education and the school performance. In other words, low 
levels of education reduce the probability of the student to pass the test, reducing the school performance. 
There is a change of trend only for high levels of education, contributing positively to the school performance; 
 There is an inverse relationship between student-teacher ratio and performance; this means that the increase of 
class size reduces the performance; in other words, the teacher gives little time to each individual student, 
which focuses there not enough to pass the test; is very well known in the literature that the class size has a 
negative effect on the test has been passed by the student; 
 
The results are confirmed when all channels are considered together, except for student-teacher ratio which loses 
significance and the level of urbanization where it no longer appears to be an exponential relationship with the 
performance. In other words, it seems that only the least populated areas contribute positively to school performance; 
this occurs because the school can optimally allocate resources among the few units, in such a way as to increase the 
performance. The results are similar when we consider math, read, and science test score, alternatively; 
Focusing only OECD countries seems that fees per student has a weaker effect, the same goes for the presence of 
computers connected to the internet, while the other two forms of funding does not contribute in some way to the school 
performance, the same goes for student-teacher ratio. Furthermore, when we consider all channels, it appears to show 
that the most populated areas have a negative effect on school performance; there is always a U-shaped relationship 
between the father's education and school performance. In these countries (so-called developed) only people with higher 
levels of education seem to contribute positively to the school performance. 
In terms of policy implications, the policy makers and regulators, in order to guarantee higher school performance, in 
OECD countries should be: 
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 increase the fees for student and public funds;  
 reduce class size;  
 increase levels of education, especially for father, given that average levels contribute negatively to the 
performance;  
 increase the number of computers connected to the internet, then given greater important to technology;  
 
 
Finally, we focus about NO-OECD countries. Now, even claim that part of the funds that contributes most, albeit 
weakly, the performance is that of charity. In fact, schools in those countries (i.e. so called developing) base their 
spending expectations on charitable offerings; the presence of computers connected to the internet does not contributes 
to the performance, also because there is a lack of technology (comparing the percentage between OECD and NO-
OECD countries); interesting result is that considering these countries, there is no longer a U-shaped between the 
father's education and school performance, but an exponential relationship as in the case in which the mother's 
education is considered; This is because, unlike the richer and more developed countries (OECD), the NO-OECD 
countries, the percentage of those who have a high level of education is very low (comparing statistics), so just a little 
(in terms of education) to facilitate his son to pass the test, ensuring the highest levels of school performance; there is 
also an exponential relationship between populous area and performance even when we consider all the channels 
together; finally, student-teacher ratio is negative and significant considering all channels; This is because, in general, 
the classes are very populous and numerously, making very difficult the task of teachers in overcoming the students 
test. In terms of policy implications, the policy makers and regulators in order to guarantee higher school performance 
in NO-OECD countries should be: 
 increase funds from charitable offerings;  
 increase the level of education;  
 reduce classe size; 
 
6. Robustness Check 
In order to check whether the findings previously showed (see Section 5.1 above) change when different estimators are 
used, we repeat our models using quantile and multilevel regression4. This part allows us to give robustness to our 
analysis supporting the results of the multi-regression estimation with the quantile regression that, in the most of the 
cases, is consistent with the conclusions which before.   
 
      6.1. Quantile Regression. The Results 
In order to make our analysis more robust, we employ the quantile analysis. Generally, quantile regression is a type of 
regression analysis used in statistics and econometrics. Whereas the method of least squares results in estimates that 
approximate the conditional mean of the response variable given certain values of the predictor variables, quantile 
regression aims at estimating either the conditional median or other quantile of the response variable. In this way, this 
method is not affected by the presence of outliers or extreme values could distort the estimation, but unlike to 
multivariate analysis does not allow controlling for simultaneity problem.  
                                                          
4 For sake of brevity and space, we only show the quantile regression, while multilevel models are available on request. 
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Quantile regression is suitable if conditional quantile functions are of interest. One advantage of quantile regression, 
relative to the ordinary least squares regression, is that the quantile regression estimates are more robust against outliers 
in the response measurements. However, the main attraction of quantile regression goes beyond that. Different 
measures of central tendency and statistical dispersion can be useful to obtain a more comprehensive analysis of the 
relationship between variables. 
In ecology, quantile regression has been proposed and used as a way to discover more useful predictive relationships 
between variables in cases where there is no relationship or only a weak relationship between the means of such 
variables. The need for and success of quantile regression in ecology has been attributed to the complexity of 
interactions between different factors leading to data with unequal variation of one variable for different ranges of 
another variable. Another application of quantile regression is in the areas of growth charts, where percentile curves are 
commonly used to screen for abnormal growth. 
Considering the math test score of student, averaged by school, both in all sample than in OECD countries the 
performance increases with the government expenditure, fees and girl’s presence; the public school has a negative effect 
and the sign of mother’s and father’s education has the same characteristics as before; no evidence is supported for 
student teacher ratio.  
As to the NO-OECD countries also in this case, such as in multi-regression, the charity funds play an important role and 
in some cases also the student fees and government expenditure are significant. As to the other determinants these have, 
more or less, the signs of before, in particular negative is the effect of student teacher ratio in all the models considered. 
As to the science score of student, averaged by school, also the student fees, government expenditure and computer 
connected to internet are significant; negative at significant level is the effect of student teacher ratio both in all sample 
than in NO-OECD countries, but this disappear when we consider only OECD countries; the other variables 
approximately affect the outcomes such as in the previously cases. 
Considering the reading test score of student, averaged by school, in the all sample the significance of variables does 
not change and the effect of student teacher ratio is negative in all the cases. Moreover, when we taking into account 
only the OECD countries the fees, computer connected to internet and student teacher ratio does not appear to be a 
significant determinants of increasing in reading, in the case of NO-OECD the charity funds appear to be less important 
than before while the student teacher ratio is negative and significant. 
Considering the average value of the all test score, as to the all sample, a similarity with the previous results exist; when 
we take into account only the OECD countries, the effect of government expenditure disappears, while student teacher 
ratio is not robust to the inclusion of all the variables. 
Surprising, considering only NO-OECD countries the government expenditure has a positive and significant coefficient; 
however very little changes affect the others component considered; the scores decrease when student teacher ratio 
increases.  
 









7. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
In this paper, we analyzed on the determinants of school performance measured by the average value of students’ tests 
score (math, reading and science) at school level. We used the PISA data from 2000 to 2012 in order to explore this 
relationship. A multivariate regression is assessed considering the different channels (funds, computers connected to 
internet, parental education, student teacher ratio, number of girls and ownership) and controlling for time and country 
fixed effects. The analysis is done both allowing for the total sample and grouping for OECD countries and NO-OECD 
countries.  
The most important results show that, considering the all sample and the only OECD countries, school performances are 
positively driven by the student fees, presence of girls and computers; also the mother’s education plays an important 
role, while the father’s one is notable only at high level, otherwise is negative. Moreover, differently from that the 
improvement of the student achievement in NO-OECD countries is encouraged from charity funds, the presence of 
girls, and the parent’s education level.  As to the student teacher ratio it negatively affects the outcomes in the most of 
the estimations performed.  
Finally it’s reasonable that more funds allow school to invest more in the quality of teaching, increasing the probability 
of student overcome the test in math, science and reading. 
This exercise might be useful to the policy makers and regulators in order to understand how the different channels 
affect school performance in different context. In particular, they could decide to give more resources in order to 
improve the educational levels in NO-OECD countries. This should help to increase the teacher’s number, reducing the 
class size and improving the school performance. Robustness checks have been performed in order to explore whether 
the results change at different empirical methods, such as quantile and multilevel regression. 
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Appendix 1: Tables on Sample and Statistics 
Table 1. The sample 








Schools (2000-2012) Frequency 
AUS 777 2.79 ALB 249 1.72 
AUT 590 2.12 ARE 483 3.34 
BEL 934 3.36 ARG 438 3.03 
CAN 2,258 8.11 AZE 230 1.59 
CHE 1,391 5.00 BGR 376 2.60 
CHL 389 1.40 BRA 1,547 10.69 
CZE 896 3.22 CHL 112 0.77 
DEU 782 2.81 COL 510 3.52 
DNK 828 2.97 CRI 240 1.66 
ESP 2,001 7.19 EST 130 0.90 
EST 271 0.97 GEO 148 1.02 
FIN 749 2.69 HKG 324 2.24 
FRA 269 0.97 HRV 365 2.52 
GBR 1,525 5.48 IDN 735 5.08 
GRC 624 2.24 ISR 101 0.70 
HUN 724 2.60 JOR 421 2.91 
IRL 525 1.89 KAZ 321 2.22 
ISL 356 1.28 KGZ 231 1.60 
ISR 257 0.92 LIE 45 0.31 
ITA 2,248 8.08 LTU 420 2.90 
JPN 648 2.33 LVA 654 4.52 
KOR 520 1.87 MAC 110 0.76 
LUX 136 0.49 MDA 138 0.95 
MEX 2,469 8.87 MLT 31 0.21 
NLD 540 1.94 MNE 119 0.82 
NOR 642 2.31 MUS 116 0.80 
NZL 593 2.13 MYS 235 1.62 
POL 651 2.34 PAN 90 0.62 
PRT 671 2.41 PER 325 2.25 
SVK 602 2.16 QAT 206 1.42 
SVN 468 1.68 QCN 239 1.65 
SWE 603 2.17 QHP 48 0.33 
TUR 458 1.65 QRS 44 0.30 
USA 439 1.58 QTN 96 0.66 
QVE 55 0.38 
ROU 385 2.66 
RUS 850 5.87 
SGP 257 1.78 
SRB 346 2.39 
SVN 295 2.04 
TAP 396 2.74 
THA 775 5.35 
TTO 107 0.74 
TUN 338 2.34 
URY 658 4.55 
VNM 136 0.94 
Total 27,834 100.00 14,475 100.00 





Table 2: Variables Description 
 
Variables Description 
Math score School performance, i.e. test score of student averaged by school in Math 
Reading score  School performance, i.e. test score of student averaged by school in Reading  
Science score School performance, i.e. test score of student averaged by school in Science 
F_gov Funding obtained by each school by the Government (%) 
F_stud_fees Funding obtained by each school by Student fees (%) 
F_benef Funding obtained by each school by Benefits (%) 
F_other Funding obtained by each school by Other Source (%) 
Computers Number of computers connected to the internet 
Boys  Number of boys enrolled in the school 
Girls Number of girls enrolled in the school 
Ownership Set of dummies (1-2) denoting the typology of school; private is used as benchmark group 
F_isced  Set of dummies (1-6) describing the fathers’ education; 1 used as benchmark group 
M_isced Set of dummies (1-6) describing the mothers’ education; 1 used as benchmark group 
Community  Set of dummies (1-5) describing the community in which school is located; 1 used as benchmark group 
Size Student-teacher ratio 




























































Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables  
 
                              
YEAR Math score Reading score Science score F_gov F_stud_fees F_benefit F_other Computers Boys Girls Ownership F_isced M_isced Community Size 
ALL 
               
2000 467,5879 466,6846 469,9534 83,7766 10,2632 3,1986 2,8394 31,8552 348,7170 355,1692 0,8260 4,1986 4,1238 2,9596 14,9163 
2003 490,4581 485,1399 490,7343 80,8260 12,7196 3,6176 3,0477 72,6774 343,7851 333,7189 0,8499 3,7626 3,7394 2,9478 14,1037 
2006 467,6538 459,4026 471,5916 80,7259 13,5680 2,7857 3,0327 86,2898 370,7683 367,5658 0,8344 3,6563 3,6155 2,9512 15,3873 
2009 455,8260 453,7206 460,2562 78,5641 15,7989 3,0080 2,8536 60,2980 384,0478 385,6732 0,8254 3,7506 3,7155 2,9986 15,8827 
2012 466,2665 467,8486 473,3987 79,7656 14,7271 2,7005 2,9251 75,3660 376,7137 378,2486 0,8063 3,8003 3,8279 3,0571 14,9983 
Mean 466,7849 464,1309 471,1488 80,2092 14,0421 2,9668 2,9349 68,6121 370,4101 370,0907 0,8250 3,7930 3,7717 2,9949 15,2065 
                
OECD 
               
2000 491,1413 489,8561 490,6585 85,4904 9,6294 2,2825 2,6945 35,7852 331,4044 333,0129 0,8028 4,2750 4,2181 2,9605 13,8699 
2003 500,7565 493,5412 498,2563 80,6473 12,8396 3,6078 3,1313 72,8323 335,2557 318,4461 0,8409 3,8109 3,7786 2,9396 13,2719 
2006 491,3231 484,5141 494,0437 79,8452 14,3548 2,7452 3,1861 88,7500 338,7301 329,8128 0,8251 3,7413 3,6962 2,9910 14,2586 
2009 484,1492 481,1808 487,6442 77,5397 16,8176 2,9195 2,9700 62,2081 342,5724 337,3881 0,8374 3,8125 3,8138 3,0018 15,1946 
2012 482,0154 483,9148 489,4032 78,6654 15,6739 2,8008 2,9884 76,2106 338,7083 330,4625 0,8064 3,8786 3,9539 3,0419 14,1602 
Mean 488,4711 485,5849 491,4867 79,7343 14,5349 2,8863 3,0135 70,2680 338,2655 330,3868 0,8228 3,8673 3,8679 2,9965 14,2560 
                
NO-OECD 
               
2000 413,9701 413,6613 421,7093 78,8596 12,2159 5,7184 3,2168 21,2562 375,1959 394,3612 0,8604 3,9663 3,8603 2,9493 17,4239 
2003 426,3546 432,8457 443,9133 81,9387 11,9729 3,6784 2,5391 71,7133 396,8771 428,7853 0,9054 3,4640 3,4973 2,9986 19,2813 
2006 428,1662 417,5088 434,1345 82,1951 12,2553 2,8532 2,7801 82,1854 424,2178 430,5495 0,8499 3,5145 3,4810 2,8845 17,2704 
2009 416,5654 415,6565 422,2920 79,9841 14,3869 3,1308 2,6939 57,6502 442,1255 452,6039 0,8087 3,6647 3,5793 2,9942 16,8365 
2012 437,5177 438,5206 444,1832 81,7740 12,9986 2,5175 2,8104 73,8243 446,7621 465,4799 0,8062 3,6577 3,5981 3,0847 16,5282 
Mean 425,7513 423,4866 432,5601 81,0389 13,1692 3,1289 2,7872 65,8870 431,2868 445,0508 0,8269 3,6423 3,5810 2,9915 17,0186 
                
PUBLIC 
               
2000 463,9374 462,2860 466,5826 87,5519 6,9942 2,8402 2,7125 31,6251 356,2172 357,5911 // 4,1750 4,1095 2,9230 14,8856 
2003 485,6733 480,9175 486,8156 80,9408 12,6399 3,6138 3,0247 73,5484 338,8682 327,6404 // 3,6924 3,6832 2,9330 14,1545 
2006 462,5873 454,0231 466,8605 81,1483 13,0298 2,9055 3,0300 86,1718 363,3956 364,6553 // 3,5750 3,5480 2,9375 15,3517 
2009 451,0296 448,3474 455,3927 79,0070 15,4269 2,9752 2,8109 60,1628 374,6139 376,1396 // 3,6646 3,6416 2,9896 15,8339 
2012 459,5865 460,7587 467,0415 80,0298 14,3392 2,7947 2,9608 75,1652 366,1529 370,2013 // 3,6800 3,7165 3,0510 15,0749 
Mean 461,6243 458,5702 466,2367 80,9251 13,3410 2,9746 2,9168 68,5865 363,3686 363,9550 // 3,7068 3,6967 2,9814 15,2074 
                
PRIVATE 
               
2000 484,9350 487,5665 485,9268 65,8538 25,7825 4,9000 3,4373 32,9475 312,2272 343,6712 // 4,3133 4,1935 3,1322 15,0624 
2003 517,5405 509,0396 512,9150 80,1767 13,1710 3,6387 3,1749 67,7474 371,6159 368,1237 // 4,1602 4,0586 3,0322 13,8165 
2006 493,1819 486,5074 495,4299 78,5976 16,2799 2,1821 3,0460 86,8842 407,9162 382,2310 // 4,0663 3,9562 3,0207 15,5664 
2009 478,4928 479,1134 483,2403 76,4711 17,5569 3,1632 3,0558 60,9365 428,5627 430,7273 // 4,1575 4,0653 3,0412 16,1134 
2012 494,0811 497,3694 499,8687 78,6655 16,3421 2,3086 2,7776 76,2021 420,6471 411,7558 // 4,3012 4,2917 3,0821 14,6793 
Mean 491,1098 490,3390 494,2959 76,8348 17,3465 2,9303 3,0199 68,7326 403,6665 399,0087 0,8250 4,2003 4,1266 3,0587 15,2025 









Appendix 2: Tables on Multivariate Regression   
Table 4: Multivariate Regression. Determinants of Math Test Score 






































                              
F_gov 0.0531
*
 0.0401 0.0788 0.0445 0.0423 0.0518 0.0446 0.0354 0.0755 0.0640
*
 0.0529 0.0845 0.0489
*
 0.0588 0.0354 
 
[0.0270] [0.0331] [0.0465] [0.0233] [0.0287] [0.0393] [0.0269] [0.0331] [0.0455] [0.0284] [0.0346] [0.0489] [0.0245] [0.0300] [0.0414] 





















[0.0286] [0.0350] [0.0494] [0.0247] [0.0304] [0.0417] [0.0285] [0.0350] [0.0482] [0.0301] [0.0367] [0.0519] [0.0259] [0.0319] [0.0439] 
                
F_benef 0.0163 -0.0312 0.124 0.0511 0.0256 0.123
*
 0.0134 -0.0276 0.109 0.0490 0.00664 0.152
*
 0.0687 0.0607 0.115 
 
[0.0398] [0.0496] [0.0665] [0.0343] [0.0430] [0.0561] [0.0395] [0.0495] [0.0650] [0.0417] [0.0517] [0.0698] [0.0360] [0.0449] [0.0591] 
                
Computers 0.00801** 0.00701* 0.00745 0.00517* 0.00410 0.00511 0.00753** 0.00695* 0.00662 0.00846** 0.00777* 0.00789 0.00613** 0.00494 0.00724 
 
[0.00252] [0.00311] [0.00430] [0.00217] [0.00270] [0.00363] [0.00250] [0.00311] [0.00421] [0.00264] [0.00324] [0.00449] [0.00228] [0.00281] [0.00382] 
                
girls 0.0360*** 0.0478*** 0.0265*** 0.0195*** 0.0271*** 0.0130*** 0.0279*** 0.0417*** 0.0161*** 0.0377*** 0.0493*** 0.0302*** 0.0203*** 0.0294*** 0.0131*** 
 
[0.000798] [0.00119] [0.00107] [0.000704] [0.00106] [0.000927] [0.000836] [0.00126] [0.00110] [0.000867] [0.00129] [0.00118] [0.000792] [0.00120] [0.00105] 
                
ownership -31.71*** -28.59*** -38.24*** -1.963** -2.313* -0.722 -27.37*** -26.48*** -29.42*** -30.55*** -27.91*** -36.36*** -1.472 -3.012** 1.502 
 
[0.810] [0.995] [1.381] [0.738] [0.908] [1.259] [0.819] [1.009] [1.381] [0.856] [1.044] [1.475] [0.781] [0.952] [1.352] 
                
misced_2 














    
[2.257] [3.171] [3.208] 
      
[2.439] [3.436] [3.440] 
                
misced_3 
















    
[2.401] [3.426] [3.371] 
      
[2.605] [3.727] [3.631] 
                
misced_4 
















    
[2.507] [3.537] [3.573] 
      
[2.715] [3.833] [3.854] 
                
misced_5 
















    
[2.595] [3.619] [3.812] 
      
[2.799] [3.911] [4.091] 
                
misced_6 
   
86.25*** 88.27*** 96.74*** 
      
88.09*** 91.47*** 95.16*** 
    
[2.803] [3.862] [4.171] 
      
[3.011] [4.151] [4.471] 
                
fisced_2 
   
-16.55*** -32.23*** 3.652 
      
-20.93*** -39.07*** 1.575 
    
[2.465] [3.474] [3.477] 
      
[2.658] [3.740] [3.744] 
                
fisced_3 
   
-11.67*** -28.50*** 9.962** 
      
-16.69*** -34.09*** 5.170 
    
[2.565] [3.666] [3.581] 
      
[2.771] [3.958] [3.868] 
                
fisced_4 












    
[2.660] [3.762] [3.768] 
      
[2.873] [4.052] [4.081] 
                
fisced_5 














    
[2.736] [3.831] [3.979] 
      
[2.953] [4.125] [4.304] 
                
fisced_6 
















    
[2.922] [4.029] [4.348] 
      
[3.143] [4.325] [4.686] 
                
Community_2 
      
11.50*** 8.535*** 13.53*** 
   
2.727** 1.256 3.474* 
       
[0.953] [1.202] [1.555] 
   
[0.870] [1.093] [1.426] 
                
Community_3 
      
20.18*** 15.21*** 25.43*** 
   
4.153*** 1.784 5.893*** 
       
[0.935] [1.186] [1.517] 
   
[0.867] [1.090] [1.427] 
                
Community_4 
      
25.93*** 16.18*** 40.04*** 
   
0.307 -6.062*** 9.739*** 
       
[0.983] [1.261] [1.560] 
   
[0.926] [1.173] [1.503] 
                
Community_5 
      
33.36*** 18.62*** 53.16*** 
   
1.987 -6.469*** 13.76*** 
       
[1.203] [1.558] [1.876] 
   
[1.139] [1.454] [1.825] 
                
size 





 -0.0160 0.0379 -0.199
***
 
          
[0.0267] [0.0305] [0.0547] [0.0230] [0.0265] [0.0464] 
































  [4.523] [4.488] [5.988] [4.392] [4.625] [6.148] [4.523] [4.556] [5.919] [4.742] [4.671] [6.333] [4.609] [4.838] [6.534] 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 46597 30090 16194 46597 30090 16194 46001 29879 15809 43035 28005 14839 42485 27822 14472 
Notes: The independent variables are the percentage of fund government, student fees, benefits, number of computers connected to Internet, number of girls, dummy for Private School, dummies describing the community in which school is 
located, dummies for fathers and mother education, student teacher ratio. The estimation allows for time and Country-level fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent 





Table 5: Multivariate Regression. Determinants of Science Test Score 






































                              
F_gov 0.0512 0.0433 0.0646 0.0430 0.0456 0.0402 0.0431 0.0396 0.0584 0.0648* 0.0514 0.0867 0.0503* 0.0578 0.0393 
 
[0.0264] [0.0329] [0.0444] [0.0228] [0.0287] [0.0377] [0.0264] [0.0329] [0.0437] [0.0278] [0.0345] [0.0467] [0.0241] [0.0300] [0.0401] 
                
F_stud_fees 0.0833** 0.0832* 0.0884 0.0535* 0.0549 0.0576 0.0707* 0.0765* 0.0769 0.0991*** 0.0940* 0.107* 0.0643* 0.0734* 0.0520 
 
[0.0280] [0.0348] [0.0471] [0.0242] [0.0304] [0.0400] [0.0280] [0.0349] [0.0463] [0.0295] [0.0366] [0.0495] [0.0256] [0.0318] [0.0425] 
                
F_benef 0.0317 -0.0192 0.134
*
 0.0656 0.0367 0.133
*
 0.0302 -0.0137 0.124
*








[0.0389] [0.0493] [0.0634] [0.0336] [0.0429] [0.0539] [0.0388] [0.0493] [0.0624] [0.0408] [0.0515] [0.0666] [0.0355] [0.0448] [0.0573] 
                
Computers 0.00659
**
 0.00560 0.00560 0.00380 0.00271 0.00328 0.00618
*
 0.00586 0.00415 0.00674
**
 0.00609 0.00590 0.00446
*
 0.00355 0.00460 
 
[0.00246] [0.00310] [0.00410] [0.00213] [0.00270] [0.00348] [0.00246] [0.00310] [0.00404] [0.00258] [0.00322] [0.00428] [0.00225] [0.00281] [0.00370] 

































[0.000781] [0.00118] [0.00102] [0.000691] [0.00106] [0.000891] [0.000821] [0.00125] [0.00105] [0.000849] [0.00129] [0.00112] [0.000782] [0.00119] [0.00101] 































[0.793] [0.990] [1.317] [0.724] [0.906] [1.209] [0.804] [1.004] [1.326] [0.839] [1.040] [1.409] [0.771] [0.952] [1.309] 
                
misced_2 
   
8.109*** 13.54*** 6.947* 
      
8.932*** 15.00*** 7.400* 
    
[2.215] [3.163] [3.081] 
      
[2.407] [3.435] [3.333] 
                
misced_3 
   
19.80*** 26.93*** 18.67*** 
      
21.07*** 29.64*** 18.79*** 
    
[2.357] [3.417] [3.238] 
      
[2.570] [3.726] [3.517] 
                
misced_4 
   
37.67*** 46.72*** 34.31*** 
      
40.10*** 50.58*** 34.72*** 
    
[2.461] [3.528] [3.432] 
      
[2.679] [3.832] [3.733] 
                
misced_5 
















    
[2.547] [3.610] [3.661] 
      
[2.762] [3.910] [3.962] 
                
misced_6 
















    
[2.751] [3.852] [4.006] 
      
[2.971] [4.150] [4.331] 
                
fisced_2 












    
[2.419] [3.464] [3.340] 
      
[2.623] [3.739] [3.627] 
                
fisced_3 
















    
[2.517] [3.656] [3.440] 
      
[2.734] [3.956] [3.747] 
                
fisced_4 
   
6.242* -12.06** 27.16*** 
      
2.085 -16.66*** 22.59*** 
    
[2.611] [3.752] [3.619] 
      
[2.835] [4.051] [3.953] 
                
fisced_5 
   
27.51*** 10.45** 43.76*** 
      
23.91*** 6.946 38.93*** 
    
[2.686] [3.821] [3.822] 
      
[2.914] [4.123] [4.169] 
                
fisced_6 
   
50.82*** 35.60*** 63.85*** 
      
47.97*** 34.14*** 57.44*** 
    
[2.868] [4.018] [4.177] 
      
[3.102] [4.323] [4.540] 
                
Community_2 








   
1.188 -0.242 2.181 
       
[0.936] [1.196] [1.493] 
   
[0.859] [1.093] [1.381] 
                
Community_3 














       
[0.918] [1.180] [1.457] 
   
[0.855] [1.090] [1.382] 
                
Community_4 
















       
[0.965] [1.254] [1.498] 
   
[0.914] [1.173] [1.456] 
                
Community_5 














       
[1.181] [1.550] [1.802] 
   
[1.124] [1.454] [1.767] 
                
size 
         
-0.0785** 0.0214 -0.432*** -0.0262 0.0214 -0.205*** 
          
[0.0262] [0.0304] [0.0522] [0.0227] [0.0265] [0.0449] 
                
const 388.5*** 478.8*** 393.8*** 294.9*** 376.4*** 274.7*** 374.9*** 469.8*** 372.6*** 385.0*** 476.0*** 394.4*** 294.4*** 375.3*** 277.8*** 
  [4.424] [4.461] [5.709] [4.311] [4.613] [5.905] [4.441] [4.534] [5.683] [4.647] [4.652] [6.045] [4.548] [4.836] [6.330] 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 46597 30090 16194 46597 30090 16194 46001 29879 15809 43035 28005 14839 42485 27822 14472 
Notes: The independent variables are the percentage of fund government, student fees, benefits, number of computers connected to Internet, number of girls, dummy for Private School, dummies describing the community in which school is 
located, dummies for fathers and mother education, student teacher ratio. The estimation allows for time and Country-level fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis.*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent 








Table 6: Multivariate Regression. Determinants of Reading Test Score 






































                              
F_gov 0.0528 0.0377 0.0769 0.0442 0.0391 0.0495 0.0459 0.0337 0.0758 0.0658* 0.0501 0.0899 0.0527* 0.0562 0.0440 
 
[0.0277] [0.0338] [0.0482] [0.0241] [0.0296] [0.0411] [0.0276] [0.0337] [0.0473] [0.0291] [0.0352] [0.0507] [0.0254] [0.0309] [0.0436] 























[0.0294] [0.0358] [0.0511] [0.0255] [0.0313] [0.0436] [0.0292] [0.0357] [0.0501] [0.0308] [0.0374] [0.0538] [0.0269] [0.0328] [0.0462] 
                
F_benef -0.000176 -0.0472 0.0963 0.0351 0.0107 0.0964 
-
0.00000555 
-0.0416 0.0881 0.0343 -0.00830 0.128 0.0576 0.0472 0.0988 
 
[0.0408] [0.0505] [0.0688] [0.0355] [0.0443] [0.0587] [0.0405] [0.0505] [0.0675] [0.0427] [0.0526] [0.0724] [0.0373] [0.0462] [0.0623] 
                
Computers 0.00612
*
 0.00463 0.00589 0.00322 0.00170 0.00353 0.00551
*
 0.00472 0.00413 0.00650
*
 0.00523 0.00673 0.00401 0.00250 0.00527 
 
[0.00258] [0.00318] [0.00445] [0.00225] [0.00278] [0.00379] [0.00257] [0.00317] [0.00437] [0.00270] [0.00330] [0.00465] [0.00236] [0.00289] [0.00402] 

































[0.000818] [0.00122] [0.00111] [0.000729] [0.00109] [0.000970] [0.000857] [0.00128] [0.00114] [0.000888] [0.00132] [0.00122] [0.000821] [0.00123] [0.00110] 
                
ownership -35.03*** -32.00*** -41.74*** -5.471*** -6.270*** -3.967** -30.27*** -29.60*** -32.38*** -33.78*** -30.98*** -40.16*** -4.695*** -6.579*** -1.640 
 
[0.831] [1.016] [1.430] [0.764] [0.935] [1.317] [0.840] [1.028] [1.435] [0.877] [1.063] [1.530] [0.810] [0.980] [1.424] 
                
misced_2 
   
10.72*** 12.43*** 12.67*** 
      
11.72*** 14.64*** 12.38*** 
    
[2.336] [3.265] [3.356] 
      
[2.529] [3.536] [3.623] 
                
misced_3 
   
22.70*** 27.27*** 23.46*** 
      
23.45*** 29.82*** 22.55*** 
    
[2.485] [3.528] [3.526] 
      
[2.701] [3.835] [3.824] 
                
misced_4 
















    
[2.595] [3.642] [3.738] 
      
[2.815] [3.945] [4.059] 
                
misced_5 
















    
[2.685] [3.726] [3.987] 
      
[2.902] [4.025] [4.308] 
                
misced_6 
















    
[2.901] [3.976] [4.363] 
      
[3.122] [4.272] [4.709] 
                
fisced_2 












    
[2.551] [3.576] [3.637] 
      
[2.756] [3.849] [3.943] 
                
fisced_3 
   
-6.486* -19.34*** 9.543* 
      
-10.71*** -24.42*** 5.540 
    
[2.654] [3.774] [3.746] 
      
[2.873] [4.073] [4.074] 
                
fisced_4 
   
9.943*** -3.135 26.52*** 
      
5.857* -7.862 22.14*** 
    
[2.753] [3.873] [3.942] 
      
[2.979] [4.170] [4.298] 
                
fisced_5 
   
30.79*** 18.75*** 43.29*** 
      
26.72*** 14.60*** 38.23*** 
    
[2.832] [3.944] [4.163] 
      
[3.062] [4.244] [4.533] 
                
fisced_6 
















    
[3.024] [4.148] [4.549] 
      
[3.259] [4.451] [4.936] 
                
Community_2 














       
[0.978] [1.225] [1.616] 
   
[0.903] [1.125] [1.501] 
                
Community_3 














       
[0.959] [1.208] [1.576] 
   
[0.899] [1.122] [1.502] 
                
Community_4 
















       
[1.009] [1.285] [1.621] 
   
[0.960] [1.207] [1.583] 
                
Community_5 
      
35.94*** 20.12*** 56.86*** 
   
4.201*** -5.338*** 16.77*** 
       
[1.234] [1.587] [1.950] 
   
[1.181] [1.496] [1.922] 
                
size 
         
-0.0799** 0.0294 -0.447*** -0.0307 0.0234 -0.215*** 
          
[0.0274] [0.0311] [0.0567] [0.0239] [0.0273] [0.0488] 
                
const 370.8*** 480.4*** 373.7*** 269.1*** 369.5*** 245.3*** 353.9*** 469.1*** 347.4*** 367.4*** 476.2*** 375.5*** 267.0*** 366.1*** 247.6*** 
  [4.639] [4.578] [6.199] [4.545] [4.762] [6.431] [4.639] [4.643] [6.149] [4.859] [4.754] [6.566] [4.779] [4.979] [6.882] 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 46597 30090 16194 46597 30090 16194 46001 29879 15809 43035 28005 14839 42485 27822 14472 
Notes: The independent variables are the percentage of fund government, student fees, benefits, number of computers connected to Internet, number of girls, dummy for Private School, dummies describing the community in which school is 
located, dummies for fathers and mother education, student teacher ratio. The estimation allows for time and Country-level fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent 






Appendix 3: Tables on Quantile Regression   
Table 7: Quantile Regression. Determinants of Math Test Score 





































F_gov 0.0604* 0.0599* 0.0603 0.0603** 0.0522* 0.104** 0.0682* 0.0566* 0.0795* 0.0893** 0.0900** 0.0502 0.0591*** 0.0642* 0.0768 
 [0.0256] [0.0256] [0.0386] [0.0216] [0.0249] [0.0327] [0.0277] [0.0280] [0.0393] [0.0272] [0.0275] [0.0435] [0.0152] [0.0299] [0.0430] 
                
F_stud_fees 0.0724** 0.0828** 0.0571 0.0581* 0.0473 0.119** 0.0753* 0.0801** 0.0889* 0.103*** 0.114*** 0.0434 0.0626*** 0.0654* 0.0934* 
 [0.0274] [0.0278] [0.0423] [0.0231] [0.0273] [0.0362] [0.0293] [0.0302] [0.0421] [0.0291] [0.0299] [0.0473] [0.0173] [0.0323] [0.0461] 
                
F_benef 0.00750 -0.0295 0.146* 0.0736* 0.0195 0.198*** 0.0274 -0.0476 0.122* 0.0936* 0.0267 0.198** 0.0945** 0.0636 0.176** 
 [0.0410] [0.0443] [0.0676] [0.0374] [0.0480] [0.0566] [0.0452] [0.0474] [0.0609] [0.0463] [0.0463] [0.0617] [0.0350] [0.0515] [0.0643] 
                
Computers 0.00623* 0.00424* 0.00939* 0.00222 0.00128 0.00117 0.00594** 0.00411 0.00599 0.00648* 0.00411 0.00898* 0.00273 0.000817 0.00512 
 [0.00245] [0.00201] [0.00423] [0.00202] [0.00288] [0.00397] [0.00183] [0.00218] [0.00376] [0.00261] [0.00255] [0.00447] [0.00239] [0.00244] [0.00472] 
                
girls 0.0407*** 0.0491*** 0.0322*** 0.0182*** 0.0228*** 0.0141*** 0.0316*** 0.0438*** 0.0187*** 0.0424*** 0.0496*** 0.0360*** 0.0193*** 0.0259*** 0.0143*** 
 [0.000980] [0.000907] [0.00120] [0.000451] [0.000669] [0.000605] [0.000723] [0.00124] [0.00126] [0.00111] [0.000836] [0.00144] [0.000594] [0.000695] [0.00113] 
                
ownership -33.00*** -29.99*** -40.60*** -3.002*** -3.317*** -2.109 -29.56*** -28.04*** -33.16*** -32.18*** -29.13*** -39.76*** -2.648** -4.643*** -0.332 
 [1.037] [1.157] [1.966] [0.767] [0.923] [1.473] [0.936] [1.175] [1.857] [1.067] [1.205] [2.077] [0.825] [0.994] [1.577] 
                
misced_2    13.24*** 18.32*** 8.522*       14.61*** 19.55*** 9.630** 
    [2.532] [4.654] [3.346]       [3.513] [5.073] [3.480] 
                
misced_3    26.98*** 34.10*** 22.22***       28.41*** 35.37*** 24.13*** 
    [2.681] [4.868] [3.499]       [3.665] [5.337] [3.651] 
                
misced_4    45.22*** 53.82*** 38.85***       47.64*** 56.47*** 39.70*** 
    [2.782] [4.947] [3.707]       [3.762] [5.429] [3.970] 
                
misced_5    70.48*** 78.35*** 66.01***       72.67*** 80.85*** 66.11*** 
    [2.869] [5.021] [4.036]       [3.828] [5.494] [4.288] 
                
misced_6    93.93*** 97.77*** 99.04***       96.64*** 101.2*** 98.27*** 
    [3.050] [5.198] [4.540]       [4.003] [5.689] [4.796] 
                
fisced_2    -7.877* -18.13** 5.017       -9.981* -23.67** 1.205 
    [3.448] [6.789] [3.810]       [4.139] [7.695] [4.222] 
                
fisced_3    -3.026 -16.48* 11.08**       -6.359 -19.76* 5.152 
    [3.529] [6.903] [3.879]       [4.217] [7.858] [4.429] 
                
fisced_4    12.38*** -2.115 27.03***       10.21* -4.428 20.81*** 
    [3.624] [6.981] [3.982]       [4.300] [7.937] [4.641] 
                
fisced_5    33.24*** 18.44** 45.89***       31.32*** 17.56* 39.31*** 
    [3.684] [7.016] [4.287]       [4.362] [7.976] [4.893] 
                
fisced_6    59.23*** 45.75*** 68.61***       58.02*** 46.59*** 60.47*** 
    [3.803] [7.150] [4.803]       [4.506] [8.083] [5.354] 
                
Community_2       9.151*** 5.165*** 14.24***    1.543 -0.745 4.610** 
       [0.867] [1.155] [1.618]    [0.881] [1.002] [1.616] 
                
Community_3       14.98*** 9.476*** 23.47***    0.913 -1.802 5.026** 
       [0.912] [1.195] [1.643]    [0.851] [1.022] [1.683] 
                
Community_4       21.63*** 12.15*** 36.57***    -1.790* -8.040*** 9.334*** 
       [0.976] [1.342] [1.667]    [0.897] [1.101] [1.742] 
                
Community_5       28.32*** 13.52*** 48.97***    -0.429 -9.511*** 12.93*** 
       [1.353] [1.796] [2.411]    [1.147] [1.517] [2.145] 
                
size          -0.0698 0.0354 -0.407*** -0.0179 0.0358 -0.215*** 
          [0.0400] [0.0280] [0.0553] [0.0101] [0.0207] [0.0400] 
                
Const 389.2*** 473.5*** 390.9*** 278.8*** 357.7*** 253.9*** 375.7*** 467.0*** 371.3*** 382.1*** 468.7*** 393.9*** 276.3*** 354.5*** 260.7*** 
 [6.358] [4.176] [7.354] [5.723] [6.873] [6.522] [6.192] [4.486] [6.646] [6.903] [4.133] [7.638] [5.985] [7.728] [7.895] 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 46723 30214 16196 46723 30214 16196 46126 30002 15811 43154 28122 14841 42603 27938 14474 
Notes: The independent variables are the percentage of fund government, student fees, benefits, number of computers connected to Internet, number of girls, dummy for Private School, dummies describing the community in which school is 
located, dummies for fathers and mother education, student teacher ratio. The estimation allows for time and Country-level fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent 





















Table 8: Quantile Regression. Determinants of Science Test Score 




























































 [0.0185] [0.0273] [0.0501] [0.0191] [0.0223] [0.0388] [0.0268] [0.0302] [0.0469] [0.0242] [0.0330] [0.0470] [0.0218] [0.0233] [0.0375] 
                
F_stud_fees 0.0656** 0.0826** 0.0514 0.0702*** 0.0856*** 0.0683 0.0809** 0.0932** 0.106* 0.0739** 0.0882* 0.0545 0.0908*** 0.100*** 0.0448 
 [0.0207] [0.0295] [0.0531] [0.0210] [0.0246] [0.0407] [0.0286] [0.0324] [0.0503] [0.0265] [0.0352] [0.0501] [0.0233] [0.0259] [0.0395] 
                




 0.0534 0.0149 0.175
**









 [0.0329] [0.0426] [0.0784] [0.0305] [0.0359] [0.0556] [0.0425] [0.0505] [0.0651] [0.0397] [0.0463] [0.0728] [0.0330] [0.0377] [0.0569] 



















 0.00406 0.00434 
 [0.00262] [0.00250] [0.00466] [0.00191] [0.00275] [0.00313] [0.00257] [0.00214] [0.00564] [0.00257] [0.00259] [0.00515] [0.00206] [0.00336] [0.00320] 
                
girls 0.0420*** 0.0491*** 0.0351*** 0.0208*** 0.0256*** 0.0153*** 0.0337*** 0.0447*** 0.0233*** 0.0438*** 0.0512*** 0.0391*** 0.0237*** 0.0301*** 0.0167*** 
 [0.000788] [0.00107] [0.00123] [0.000372] [0.000546] [0.000888] [0.000594] [0.000740] [0.00132] [0.000785] [0.000846] [0.00132] [0.000431] [0.000759] [0.000878] 






























 [1.012] [1.129] [1.881] [0.769] [0.928] [1.260] [1.014] [1.153] [1.841] [1.083] [1.145] [2.020] [0.805] [1.009] [1.265] 
                
misced_2    13.29*** 23.10*** 7.580*       15.04*** 27.33*** 6.813 
    [2.192] [4.084] [3.117]       [2.831] [5.019] [3.791] 
                
misced_3    25.60*** 37.79*** 19.65***       28.19*** 41.93*** 18.64*** 
    [2.351] [4.373] [3.290]       [2.988] [5.335] [3.983] 
                













    [2.474] [4.479] [3.516]       [3.089] [5.427] [4.182] 
                
misced_5    67.83*** 81.06*** 60.39***       70.71*** 85.99*** 59.77*** 
    [2.578] [4.554] [3.832]       [3.177] [5.494] [4.442] 
                
misced_6    89.49*** 98.67*** 90.86***       92.48*** 104.3*** 90.12*** 
    [2.786] [4.764] [4.247]       [3.376] [5.642] [4.823] 
                
fisced_2    -5.535 -19.67
***





    [3.370] [4.570] [4.286]       [3.664] [5.670] [5.308] 
                
fisced_3    -1.895 -20.48*** 11.44**       -6.762 -24.47*** 7.184 
    [3.449] [4.730] [4.431]       [3.729] [5.813] [5.408] 
                









    [3.557] [4.834] [4.594]       [3.835] [5.929] [5.569] 
                













    [3.618] [4.891] [4.800]       [3.903] [5.997] [5.766] 
                
fisced_6    57.83*** 40.87*** 66.45***       56.09*** 42.81*** 58.91*** 
    [3.773] [5.022] [5.239]       [4.075] [6.123] [6.106] 
                






    -0.916 -2.507
*
 1.624 
       [0.875] [1.023] [1.389]    [0.822] [1.126] [1.433] 
                
Community_3       13.27*** 8.077*** 21.39***    -1.567 -3.564** 2.683 
       [0.892] [1.041] [1.620]    [0.850] [1.116] [1.520] 
                













       [0.972] [1.177] [1.641]    [0.912] [1.204] [1.576] 
                













       [1.409] [1.708] [2.123]    [1.182] [1.518] [1.839] 
                
size          -0.0812*** 0.00774 -0.501*** -0.0423*** 0.0229 -0.230*** 
          [0.0164] [0.0261] [0.0551] [0.00939] [0.0182] [0.0421] 
































 [4.063] [4.318] [6.186] [4.840] [4.869] [7.378] [5.067] [4.455] [6.566] [4.780] [4.701] [5.801] [5.166] [5.997] [7.991] 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 46725 30217 16195 46725 30217 16195 46127 30004 15810 43156 28125 14840 42604 27940 14473 
Notes: The independent variables are the percentage of fund government, student fees, benefits, number of computers connected to Internet, number of girls, dummy for Private School, dummies describing the community in which school is 
located, dummies for fathers and mother education, student teacher ratio. The estimation allows for time and Country-level fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent 





















Table 9: Quantile Regression. Determinants of Reading Test Score 













































 0.0680 0.0488 0.0342 0.0810 0.0657
*





 [0.0234] [0.0282] [0.0555] [0.0260] [0.0312] [0.0510] [0.0259] [0.0334] [0.0535] [0.0266] [0.0317] [0.0666] [0.0270] [0.0265] [0.0548] 
                
F_stud_fees 0.0892*** 0.0570 0.148* 0.0682* 0.0761* 0.0847 0.0762** 0.0669 0.104 0.0945*** 0.0716* 0.111 0.0926** 0.0966*** 0.0657 
 [0.0253] [0.0311] [0.0592] [0.0276] [0.0330] [0.0538] [0.0275] [0.0362] [0.0565] [0.0285] [0.0345] [0.0697] [0.0284] [0.0289] [0.0563] 
                
F_benef 0.0153 -0.0779 0.222
**




 0.0676 0.0948 
 [0.0406] [0.0422] [0.0737] [0.0415] [0.0480] [0.0734] [0.0357] [0.0475] [0.0728] [0.0424] [0.0518] [0.0814] [0.0408] [0.0422] [0.0758] 
                
Computers 0.00609
*
 0.00530 0.0108 0.00579
*
 0.00285 0.00266 0.00653
*
 0.00400 0.00649 0.00679
*
 0.00466 0.0108 0.00530
*
 0.000151 0.00612 
 [0.00263] [0.00300] [0.00579] [0.00270] [0.00319] [0.00479] [0.00298] [0.00284] [0.00509] [0.00284] [0.00334] [0.00656] [0.00268] [0.00322] [0.00575] 
                
girls 0.0560*** 0.0641*** 0.0459*** 0.0337*** 0.0398*** 0.0269*** 0.0451*** 0.0571*** 0.0312*** 0.0579*** 0.0665*** 0.0509*** 0.0352*** 0.0433*** 0.0268*** 
 [0.000534] [0.00117] [0.000804] [0.000702] [0.000530] [0.00116] [0.000577] [0.000534] [0.00151] [0.000910] [0.00146] [0.00136] [0.000763] [0.000721] [0.00128] 




























 [0.896] [1.058] [2.119] [0.843] [1.026] [1.551] [0.978] [1.073] [1.967] [0.977] [1.140] [2.102] [0.866] [1.018] [1.623] 
                
misced_2    14.14*** 19.92*** 10.95**       15.10*** 20.23*** 12.49* 
    [3.556] [4.689] [3.641]       [2.872] [4.788] [5.130] 
                
misced_3    27.10*** 34.79*** 22.55***       27.76*** 36.28*** 25.01*** 
    [3.698] [4.907] [3.860]       [3.090] [5.123] [5.328] 
                













    [3.806] [5.019] [4.122]       [3.242] [5.245] [5.582] 
                
misced_5    70.94*** 78.19*** 70.55***       72.94*** 80.33*** 71.75*** 
    [3.882] [5.088] [4.445]       [3.331] [5.317] [5.836] 
                













    [4.041] [5.275] [4.915]       [3.535] [5.515] [6.149] 
                
fisced_2    -2.731 -14.84
**
 7.570       -3.532 -16.92
**
 4.705 
    [3.944] [5.099] [3.989]       [3.870] [5.908] [5.744] 
                
fisced_3    2.758 -11.11* 13.86***       1.063 -12.76* 8.667 
    [4.022] [5.266] [4.141]       [4.036] [6.117] [5.884] 
                









    [4.108] [5.339] [4.360]       [4.137] [6.213] [6.088] 
                
fisced_5    39.64*** 25.42*** 48.25***       37.71*** 25.14*** 42.09*** 
    [4.175] [5.402] [4.652]       [4.208] [6.271] [6.335] 
                
fisced_6    64.60*** 51.28*** 68.76***       62.64*** 52.87*** 60.84*** 
    [4.299] [5.541] [5.122]       [4.361] [6.412] [6.641] 
                






    1.390 -1.564 3.850
*
 
       [0.807] [0.990] [1.540]    [0.925] [1.054] [1.618] 
                
Community_3       16.45*** 10.74*** 25.70***    2.639** -1.518 6.422*** 
       [0.856] [1.033] [1.634]    [0.902] [1.068] [1.698] 
                











       [0.928] [1.139] [1.710]    [0.983] [1.162] [1.807] 
                











       [1.376] [1.668] [2.248]    [1.312] [1.580] [2.083] 
                
size          -0.135*** 0.0224 -0.515*** -0.0814*** 0.0178 -0.274*** 
          [0.0386] [0.0430] [0.0612] [0.00977] [0.0395] [0.0508] 
































 [5.045] [4.428] [6.853] [6.250] [5.655] [7.377] [4.241] [4.653] [6.370] [4.083] [4.426] [8.511] [6.395] [6.339] [9.132] 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 46615 30105 16197 46615 30105 16197 46016 29891 15812 43053 28020 14842 42500 27834 14475 
Notes: The independent variables are the percentage of fund government, student fees, benefits, number of computers connected to Internet, number of girls, dummy for Private School, dummies describing the community in which school is 
located, dummies for fathers and mother education, student teacher ratio. The estimation allows for time and Country-level fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent 























Table 10: Quantile Regression. Determinants of (Mean) Test Score 

















































 0.0597 0.0717 0.0742
**







 [0.0223] [0.0314] [0.0317] [0.0246] [0.0293] [0.0362] [0.0269] [0.0320] [0.0447] [0.0285] [0.0353] [0.0491] [0.0266] [0.0256] [0.0381] 


























 [0.0241] [0.0329] [0.0369] [0.0257] [0.0310] [0.0390] [0.0284] [0.0338] [0.0478] [0.0303] [0.0366] [0.0527] [0.0280] [0.0278] [0.0411] 
                
F_benef 0.0372 -0.0187 0.168** 0.0729 0.0313 0.228*** 0.0361 -0.0176 0.134* 0.0713 0.0202 0.218*** 0.0946* 0.0525 0.199*** 
 [0.0349] [0.0485] [0.0557] [0.0395] [0.0450] [0.0417] [0.0469] [0.0488] [0.0562] [0.0443] [0.0497] [0.0654] [0.0429] [0.0436] [0.0490] 
                
Computers 0.00745
**
 0.00524 0.00831 0.00446
*















 [0.00288] [0.00287] [0.00530] [0.00184] [0.00228] [0.00262] [0.00224] [0.00211] [0.00433] [0.00310] [0.00291] [0.00592] [0.00194] [0.00119] [0.00283] 
                
girls 0.0474*** 0.0553*** 0.0388*** 0.0245*** 0.0296*** 0.0185*** 0.0381*** 0.0494*** 0.0250*** 0.0493*** 0.0568*** 0.0436*** 0.0263*** 0.0334*** 0.0191*** 
 [0.000766] [0.000866] [0.00127] [0.000582] [0.000757] [0.00101] [0.000515] [0.000718] [0.00121] [0.000686] [0.000396] [0.00137] [0.000520] [0.000793] [0.00101] 
                
ownership -34.31*** -31.50*** -41.08*** -3.871*** -5.048*** -3.360* -30.25*** -29.28*** -33.02*** -33.40*** -30.45*** -39.38*** -3.597*** -5.881*** -0.902 
 [0.897] [1.037] [1.918] [0.742] [0.898] [1.332] [0.924] [1.084] [1.828] [0.947] [1.085] [1.926] [0.807] [0.954] [1.390] 
                













    [2.674] [4.936] [2.887]       [2.743] [4.938] [2.539] 
                
misced_3    24.80*** 35.53*** 21.71***       27.69*** 40.18*** 21.53*** 
    [2.824] [5.084] [3.177]       [2.915] [5.159] [2.841] 
                
misced_4    42.72*** 54.21*** 38.25***       46.96*** 59.27*** 38.61*** 
    [2.942] [5.188] [3.433]       [3.041] [5.292] [3.169] 
                













    [3.020] [5.255] [3.733]       [3.118] [5.359] [3.461] 
                
misced_6    91.68*** 97.10*** 100.1***       96.61*** 102.8*** 99.03*** 
    [3.199] [5.430] [4.196]       [3.325] [5.540] [3.855] 
                
fisced_2    -2.978 -17.98
**
 5.114       -6.682 -24.00
***
 2.020 
    [3.171] [6.120] [3.294]       [3.536] [6.656] [2.785] 
                









    [3.292] [6.211] [3.528]       [3.680] [6.836] [3.089] 
                
fisced_4    17.57*** -0.784 29.12***       13.75*** -3.618 23.54*** 
    [3.374] [6.291] [3.755]       [3.763] [6.908] [3.383] 
                













    [3.439] [6.340] [3.982]       [3.832] [6.960] [3.651] 
                
fisced_6    62.40*** 45.89*** 66.77***       59.30*** 46.30*** 59.52*** 
    [3.548] [6.448] [4.442]       [3.970] [7.061] [4.079] 
                






    0.501 -1.764 3.098
*
 
       [0.836] [1.103] [1.354]    [0.805] [1.026] [1.319] 
                











       [0.881] [1.133] [1.498]    [0.828] [1.015] [1.405] 
                
Community_4       21.75*** 11.71*** 35.78***    -2.471** -9.095*** 8.027*** 
       [0.923] [1.212] [1.566]    [0.906] [1.111] [1.484] 
                











       [1.332] [1.613] [1.927]    [1.162] [1.470] [1.882] 
                











          [0.00433] [0.00918] [0.0544] [0.0155] [0.0321] [0.0207] 
                
const 382.0*** 484.7*** 386.0*** 270.4*** 365.1*** 251.4*** 368.3*** 478.1*** 363.3*** 380.0*** 481.3*** 390.6*** 269.7*** 361.0*** 259.1*** 
 [3.963] [4.314] [5.330] [5.044] [6.664] [6.628] [4.685] [4.595] [6.448] [4.778] [4.621] [6.677] [5.817] [6.815] [6.576] 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 46597 30090 16194 46597 30090 16194 46001 29879 15809 43035 28005 14839 42485 27822 14472 
Notes: The independent variables are the percentage of fund government, student fees, benefits, number of computers connected to Internet, number of girls, dummy for Private School, dummies describing the community in which school is 
located, dummies for fathers and mother education, student teacher ratio. The estimation allows for time and Country-level fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent 
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level; Standard errors in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
